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Dream Palaces of Law:
Western Constructions of the
Muslim Legal Worldt
By HAIDER ALA HAMOUDI*
When I was first called by Professors Reimann and Mattei and
given the honor of an opportunity to speak before you on the subject
of "How the West Views the Rest," my immediate concern was
definitional. To some extent, this revolved around the mysterious
term "Rest." What could I say, in only a few minutes, about the
entire non-Western world that would not either be wildly inaccurate
in any number of contexts, or so general as to be effectively
meaningless? I did not ponder the matter long. Having no hope of
providing any useful insights on how the West might view the
entire rest of the world, and condemned with insufficient
knowledge on important parts of that world to even render an
opinion on it, I decided to confine most of my remarks to that
portion of the earth on which I have some knowledge, the Muslim
world, with a particular but by no means exclusive focus on that one
country in the Muslim world whose fate is, in these perilous times,
deeply intertwined with American interests and influences, Iraq. I
hope that this examination might shed some light, however meager,
t Remarks from The West and the Rest in Comparative Law, 2008 Annual
Meeting of the American Society of Comparative Law, University of California,
Hastings College of the Law (Oct. 2-4, 2008).
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on the broader question of the West and its constructions of the
Rest.
But in addition to what might perhaps be common confusion
concerning precisely who the "Rest" are, how does one go about
determining the "West?" This is a particularly acute problem when
one has chosen the focal point of the "Rest" that I have. The West,
when it comes to the Muslim world, especially Iraq, is no monolith;
there are divisions everywhere. Chasms separate France from the
United States, England from Germany, conservatives from liberals,
academics from journalists, faithful from nonbelievers, in their
projections of the Muslim East. Our region of the world is,
depending on which Western constituency you might be speaking
to, a dark and violent place governed by a false religion and the
traditions of an evil prophet,' a backwards and silly part of the
world that cannot seem to come to terms with economic
development and modernity, 2 a tragic story of good people of
ordinarily moderate beliefs whose religion has been hijacked by
forces of extremism, 3  or any number of permutations or
1. This seems to be a rather popular position among certain elements of
America's religious right in particular. Rev. Rod Parsley, for example, of the World
Harvest Church of Columbus, Ohio, whose endorsement of John McCain had been
sought for some number of months, described the Prophet Muhammad as "the
mouthpiece of a conspiracy of spiritual evil" and Islam as an "anti-Christ," the
destruction of which was a reason for the founding of the United States. See Brian
Ross, Avni Patel and Rehab Al-Buri, McCain Pastor: Islam is a 'Conspiracy of Spiritual
Evil', ABC NEWS, May 22, 2008, http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/Story?id=4905624
&page=l (last visited March 20, 2009). A United States Lieutenant General
expressed similar sentiments. Brian Knowlton, General Compares Militants to 'Satan':
Comments on Islam Irk the White House, INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE (October 20,
2003), available at http:/ / ww.iht.com/articles/2003/10/20/policy-ed3-.php.
2. This appears to be a prevailing sentiment within particular European
circles. The late Pim Fortuyn, for example, referred to Islam as fostering a
"backwards culture." Obituary: Pim Fortuyn, BBC NEWS (May 6, 2002), available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1971462.stm.
3. This of course is the politically correct rendition of Islam and the Muslim
world repeated by countless statesmen in Western democracies. See, e.g., George
W. Bush, United States President, Address at the Islamic Center of Washington,
D.C. (Sept. 17, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/legalinfo/
bushremarks.php ("The face of terror is not the true faith of Islam. That's not what
Islam is all about. Islam is peace. These terrorists don't represent peace. They
represent evil and war. When we think of Islam we think of a faith that brings
comfort to a billion people around the world. Billions of people find comfort and
solace and peace. And that's made brothers and sisters out of every race - out of
every race."); Sarkozy Lauds Islam at Louvre Ceremony with Saudi Prince, AFP (July 16,
2008) (quoting Sarkozy as indicating that 'Islam is progress, science, finesse,
modernity, and that fanaticism in the name of Islam is a corruption of Islam.');
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combinations of these.
Finally, I believed it important to avoid the perils of self-
congratulation. That is, I did not want to lead an exercise in scoffing
at the ignorant hordes who did not know an Arab from a Muslim, a
Turk from an Egyptian, a Shi'ite from a Sunni, and bemoan the fact
that such hordes controlled our political and civic discourse, and
how much better all would be if only we academics were heard.
There is much that is wrong with our understandings of the Muslim
Rest, as the story of Iraq I hope will demonstrate, that pervades
every community, from the most learned to the least enlightened.
In fact, in many ways Western distortions of the Muslim East
nearly always take the same form, irrespective of who in the West is
doing the distorting. One common theme can be generally gleaned
from any projections of the Muslim East in the West, in any Western
country, among nearly every community, including, and perhaps
especially, our own academic community. This is the perception of
the near ubiquitous role of Islam and, more germane to my remarks,
Islamic law, of a historic, medieval kind, in governing the legal
order of Muslim states, including Iraq, in a manner that can be
entirely distorting. In these brief remarks, I hope first to expose this
bias, and then to provide at least rudimentary ideas on how law,
both Islamic and secular, in the Muslim world might better be
studied and understood, particularly by comparatists.
The general, conventional story of Iraq, told countless times in
the media, is that Saddam Hussein, as an archsecularist, albeit a
brutal one, was adept at holding back the rising waters of political
Islam within his own nation, even as the movement's tentacles
spread elsewhere across the broader Muslim world.4 As a result,
women were liberated and educated in Saddamist Iraq, the "envy of
women across the Middle East,"5 alcohol was available, and Islamic
Matthew Tempest, Blair Launches Fund to Improve Teaching of Islam, THE GUARDIAN
(June 4, 2007), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2007/jun/04/
immigrationpolicy.religion (describing similar views of Islam from Tony Blair).
4. See, e.g., Teri Judd, For the Women of Iraq, the War is Just Beginning, THE
INDEPENDENT (June 8, 2006), available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/
world/middle-east/for-the-women-of-iraq-the-war-is-just-beginning-481497.html;
Maureen Dowd, My Private Idaho, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2005), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/24/opinion/24dowd.html (describing the US
as "caving on women's rights" in Iraq).
5. Judd, supra note 4.
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law, whether as the law of the family or otherwise, irrelevant.6
Depending on the constituency, this may be phrased as a defense of
Saddam himself or merely a salutary aspect of an otherwise bleak
period of rule, but the notion that Saddam was a beacon of
secularism in a broader Islamist polity is not seriously questioned.
All of this changed when Saddam was deposed. Pro-Iranian
Islamist parties quickly seized control of the government, and
secular rule has generally deteriorated, as the tale is told by our
cognoscenti.
7
In essence, what we learn from this story, in a way a template
for the broader misunderstanding of the Muslim world, is that
secular law in the region is illegitimate and viewed with suspicion,
sustained only by brutal suppression of alternatives. Once
alternatives are made available, Islam inserts itself, and a form of
classical shari'a, that body of rules and norms derived from sacred
text by the medieval jurists of the four schools of thought, becomes
the law of the land. A similar story is told, for example, in Turkey,
where the ruling party in the Muslim world's most secular state is
repeatedly referred to in media outlets as a "moderate Islamist"
party.8
What then might be able to vindicate some form of secular rule
in the Muslim world? This is where our scholars insert themselves
where the media leaves off, and provide, as their answer to the
conundrum, that same shari'a. If the Constitution, it is argued,
declares that laws may not be passed that violate the core tenets, or
unambiguous rulings, or certain provisions, of the shari'a, (the so-
called repugnancy clauses) then the legislature becomes in essence
an administrative authority, enacting secular codes but at the same
time in doing so not only avoiding contravening God's rule, but
6. Dowd, supra note 4; Vivian Stromberg, Protecting Women's Rights in Iraq,
DET. FREE PRESS (Aug. 10, 2005); Brooke D. Rodgers-Miller, Seminar Papers On
Women And Islamic Law: Out Of Jahiliyya: Historic And Modern Incarnations Of
Polygamy In The Islamic World, 11 WM. & M. J. WOM. & L. 541, 561 (2005) (suggesting
that the abolishment of the Personal Status Law would reintroduce shari'a); Pamela
Constable, Iraqi Women Fear Push For Sharia Law, C-n. TRIB. A2 (Jan. 21, 2004);
Charles Clover and Nicolas Pelham, Iraqi Plan for Shari'a Law a 'Sop' to Clerics,
Women Say, FIN. TIM. All Uan. 15, 2004).
7. Judd, supra note 4; Dowd, supra note 4, Stromberg, supra note 6; Rodgers-
Miller, supra note 6; Clover and Pelham, supra note 6.
8. See, e.g., Patrick Cockburn, Turks Mull Invasion of Iraq After PKK Ambush, THE
INDEPENDENT, October 22, 2007 at 20, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/
news/world/europe/turks-mull-invasion-of-iraq-after-pkk-ambush-397553.html.
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indeed acting in furtherance of the goals of God's Law. As to
whether this is good or bad, the learned will differ, but it is the
story. The religion, above all, from a legal perspective, is
fundamentally about the discovery of God's Law from sacred text,
and all else must be justified on the basis of that.
Scholarly books are thus written about Egypt's repugnancy
clause,9 and tremendous focus is also placed on Iraq's.10 Articles
appear in respected law reviews decrying this phenomenon as the
advent of a pernicious form of "theocratic constitutionalism,"" or in
the alternative describing it hopefully, either as the initiation of rule
of law reform in the benighted Abode of Islam 12 or as a means to
balance juristic influence with popular sentiment in the
determination of Islamic law.' 3  Reading elite constitutional
scholarship on countries such as Egypt or Iraq, one might be
forgiven for thinking that the entire document consisted of a single
provision - the repugnancy clause.
From this notion that shari'a justifies the enactment of secular
codes through Islamic constitutionalism, much apparently follows
in the Western mind, as fruit from a poisonous tree. How to justify
the trial and capture of Osama Bin Laden? Try him according to
classical Islamic criminal rules!14 How about the difficulty of
reforming, in Iraq, the means by which security may be obtained for
a loan, so that it operates in the manner that our own UCC Article 9
does? Simply create the rules in the manner that comply with
Islamic finance!15
9. CLARK B. LOMBARDI, STATE LAW As IsLAMIc LAW IN MODERN EGYPT: THE
INCORPORATION OF THE SHARfA INTO EGYPTIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 123 et seq.
(2006)
10. See, e.g., Intisar Rabb, "We the Jurists", Islamic Constitutionalism in Iraq, 10 U.
PENN. J. CONST. L. 527 (2008); Larry Cata Backer, God(s) Over Constitutions:
International and Religious Transnational Constitutionalism in the 21st Century, 27 MISS.
C. L. REV. 11 (2007-2008); Noah Feldman, Constitutional Politics and Text in the New
Iraq: An Experiment in Islamic Democracy, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 883 (2006); Ran
Hirschl, The Theocratic Challenge to Constitution Drafting in Post-Conflict States, 49
WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. 1179 (2008).
11. Backer, supra note 10 at 13.
12. NOAH FELDMAN, THE FALL AND RISE OF THE ISLAMIC STATE 10-13 (2008).
13. Rabb, supra note 10 at 527.
14. Frank E. Vogel, The Trial of Terrorists under Classical Islamic Law, 43 HARV.
INTL. L.J. 53 (2002).
15. Mark J. Sundahl, Iraq, Secured Transactions, and the Promise of Islamic Law, 40
VAND. J. TRANS. L. 1301 (2007).
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In the context of Iraq, where much of this discussion is focused,
all of this might be interesting, if it sustained even casual interest
within Iraq's legal community. I have been making a valiant,
though at times unsuccessful, attempt to read through all of the
decisions of the Supreme Federal Court of Iraq concerning matters
of constitutionality, and I have yet to come upon a case that even
cites Article 2 of the Constitution at all. Certainly there have been
no reports of any serious engagement with its terms. There is a
reason for this - the judges of Baghdad hardly wish to pronounce on
shari'a in a manner that might vex the jurists of Najaf, particularly
because the Constitution envisages judge and jurist working
together on the Court, and no Iraqi judge I have met has the
slightest proclivity toward working on a court with people that have
no legal training and whose professional culture is entirely different.
So long as the court stays out of shari'a, one judge told me, then
Najaf will probably stay out of the court.
Whether or not this prognostication is true, we shall see, but on
the notion that the Constitution's Article 2 at this point is hardly a
matter of great concern to Iraqi lawyers and judges, there can be
little doubt. Iraqi legal professionals routinely point to other legal
disputes - concerning provincial elections, the fate of Kirkuk,
restorations of property expropriated by the former regime, de-
Ba'athification and the like. The mind-numbingly tedious sessions
of Parliament, and the refreshingly brief opinions of the Federal
Court do not, based on my own studied observations of the same,
dwell excessively, if at all, on Article 2 of the Constitution even as
they engage any number of other, important legal issues.
While other states, such as Egypt, might well have more
developed jurisprudence concerning the repugnancy clause, the
attention nevertheless tends to become much ado about relatively
little. This is particularly because the Supreme Constitutional Court
has taken enormous strides to limit the influence of the repugnancy
clause, declaring it, for example, injusticable inasmuch as it concerns
claims respecting prior enacted legislation.16 This makes the interest
provision of the Civil Code valid until the legislature decides to
"Islamicize" it. More than two decades have passed, and the
16. Rector of the Azhar University v. President of the Republic, Case No. 20 of
Judicial Year No. 1 (Sup. Constitutional Ct.) (Egypt), reprinted in Supreme
Constitutional Court (Egypt) - Shari'a and Riba: Decision in Case No. 20 of Judicial Year
No. 1, reported in 1 ARAB L. Q. 101 (1985).
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legislature has done nothing of the sort. And so the taking of
interest remains as legal today as it has ever been, notwithstanding
the repugnancy clause.
This notion that the shari'a must be used to justify the laws of
the Muslim world is even more misguided when we leave the world
of constitutionalism. No Islamist party in Iraq suggested using
Islamic criminal rules to try Saddam Hussein, and the divisions over
his trial and execution divide neatly along sectarian lines, not levels
of religiosity. In fact, no Iraqi legal professional I know, no matter
how devout, no matter how Islamist, would find navigating
medieval criminal shari'a any more comprehensible than Attorney
General Mukasey would. The notion of Article 9 and Islamic
finance seems even more bewildering in a state in which there are
no significant Islamic banks, there have been no moves by any major
Islamist party to ban the taking of interest on a loan, and the
Minister of Finance, from the country's largest Islamist party, has
agreed to reductions of state debt in a manner that recognizes a
reduced, but very real, obligation to pay down debt, with interest.' 7
In other contexts, much the same conclusions can be drawn.
During my last trip to Iraq, this past August, it remained as easy to
get a beer in Baghdad as it is in Pennsylvania (which, by the way, is
not very easy), and far easier in Suleymania than in New York
(meaning the liquor stores were open well into the night, and seven
days a week). Unveiled women were still the norm in Suleymania,
still the significant minority in Baghdad. Secular law seems as
firmly embedded as ever, in this state governed by Islamist parties.
Even jurists tend to recognize these central tenets of the post-
colonial social and legal order. When they get involved in affairs of
the state, and they often do through the issuance of religious rulings
or in the context of Friday sermons, they invariably address matters
that hardly appear to be Islamic law in any classical sense - the
insistence that the constitution be drafted, 18 or that Parliament pass
an Elections Law immediately. 19 Inasmuch as the jurists address
more religious matters (such as the sinful material people are
17. William Neikirk, Debt Deal is a Boon for Iraq, CHI. TRIB. C19 (Dec. 17, 2004).
18. Mohamad Bazzi, The Al-Sistani Factor in Iraq Election, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 30,
2005, available at http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/wire/ny-woshia-
0130,0,5017706.story (relating to Grand Ayatollah Sistani).
19. Islamic Law in Our Times, http://muslimlawprof.org (last visited March
20, 2009).
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watching on television), these rulings and sermons almost
invariably do not call for state intervention. 20 If this is the case in
Iraq, it is dramatically the more so in a state like Turkey, where the
supposed Islamist party has proclaimed loudly, repeatedly and
emphatically that the shari'a has no place in the law of the state. 21
None of this is to suggest that Islamic law, of a modem sort, is
irrelevant in Muslim polities such as Iraq. In Iraq, Islamist parties
have sought to amend the Personal Status Code in a manner that
would have some effect on rulemaking in that particular legal
field.22 Islamic commerce can be important in private transactions
among smaller merchants.23 When the state was absent during
particularly troublesome times in both Shi'a and Sunni areas,
militias took control of areas and enforced their own version of
Islamic law.24 The fear of nonstate elements being able to do the
same now, or in the future, remains acute.25
Thus, shari'a is extremely important in non-state capacities,
from private commerce to unregistered marriages to private
enforcement of dress codes, all of which deserve greater study. It is
important in family law. It can at times result in the alteration of
particular state rules in the Muslim world (though not Iraq), such as
the criminalization of nonmarital sex or the rendering of
homosexuality a capital crime, which, if implemented, would have
profound effects on the individuals so affected.26
20. See id. for English commentary on a Friday sermon by an influential cleric
on such matters.
21. AKP Strives to Shrug off Islamist Image, Turkish Daily News, available at
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/vote2007/article.php?enewsid=7; Susanna
Dokupil, The Separation of Mosque and State: Islam and Democracy in Modern Turkey,
105 W. VA. L. REV. 53, 127 (2002); AKP Official Website, http://eng.akparti.org.tr/
english/partyprogramme.html#2.1 (last visited Mart 20, 2009) ("Our Party refuses
to take advantage of sacred religious values and ethnicity and to use them for
political purposes.").
22. Haider Ala Hamoudi, Money Laundering Amidst Mortars: Legislative Process
and State Authority in Post-Invasion Iraq, 16 J. TRANSNAT'L. L. & CONTEM. PROBS. 523,
543 (2007).
23. See generally Haider Ala Hamoudi, Baghdad Booksellers, Basra Carpet
Merchants, and the Law of God and Man: Legal Pluralism and the Contemporary Muslim
Experience, 1 BERK. J. MIDDLE E. & ISLAMIc L. 83 (2008).
24. See, e.g., Judd, supra note 4.
25. Steven Farrell, Divining a Lesson in Basra, N.Y. TIMES, Week in Review (May
25, 2008)
26. RUUD PETERS, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN IsLAMIc LAW 156-58 (2005)
(describing Pakistan).
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However, the basic, secular legal foundation on which the state
is founded - its training of legal professionals, its secular codes, its
rulemaking authorities - are not under threat, not in Egypt, not in
Pakistan, not even in Iraq, where Islamists rule. Inasmuch as shari'a
plays a role in any Muslim state, it is because it is legitimized through
state processes, that is, it is enacted by the state in a manner that
complies with Hart's rule of recognition, and is then interpreted by
secular lawyers with secular legal training.
That Shi'a jurists and their Shi'a constituencies would, as noted
above, prefer shari'a to be developed in a different professional
culture, that of the Najaf seminaries, goes a long way to explaining
why so little has been enacted by way of Islamic statutes in
contemporary Iraq and shari'a's primary force in Iraq lies in nonstate
capacities. More Islamization might take place in Sunni countries
such as Pakistan or Egypt, where there are weaker juristic
influences, but the process is the same. Either the shari'a is a rule of
the social order divorced from state law and using entirely private
means of enforcement such as shaming and the like, or it is enacted
according to secular state processes and applied by secular officials
with secular training. The West, then, has the Muslim Rest precisely
backwards. Shari'a does not justify secular law, but secular law can
recognize and employ shari'a as part of the law. It is the state that
grants legitimacy and authority to the shari'a as law, and not the
reverse.
Moreover, not only are the notions of state supremacy over law
are as firm as ever, but the substantive role of shari'a is also not very
much different than it was prior to the invasion. The notion that
creeping Islamism was somehow foreign to Saddamist rule is a false
one. It was a Saddam era regulation that prevented women from
obtaining a passport without the permission of a father or
husband.27 Saddam era rules added particularly harsh criminal
punishments reminiscent of shari'a such as amputations, though
hardly in a manner consistent with shari'a. All of these punishments
have now been suspended. The Personal Status Code was always
deeply influenced by shari'a, and amendments that made it even
more so (unequal rights to inheritance, and a broader right for men
to engage in polygamy) were enacted decades before the American
27. Sara Hamoudi, Women's Rights and the Iraqi Constitution in Practice, August
7, 2008, JURIST, available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/dateline/
#2333391928047846327.
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invasion, and years before even Saddam assumed control.28 These
are often described as secular accommodations to the shari'a to
appease Islamist forces. 29 But in Iraq the Islamists have taken over,
and in Pakistan they certainly had a friend in power in the person of
General Zia ul Haqq. Yet beyond nonstate applications of shari'a,
the only possible changes being discussed (or in the case of Pakistan,
enacted) would easily fall within the rubric of similar
"accommodations." As we all saw from the dramatic lawyers'
demonstrations throughout Pakistan not long ago, the notion that
the secular legal system carries no internal legitimacy absent some
sort of authority from the shari'a is difficult to support. There is
precious little to support the notion that we have been witnessing
"the fall and rise of the Islamic state" in the Muslim world.
Unfortunately, however, the West is slow to catch on to these
trends. The manifestations of this are evident everywhere. I am
asked at academic conferences how it can be that shari'a prohibits the
taking of interest, yet Prince Talal invests in Citibank, as if every
Muslim is bound first and foremost to the shari'a. A Bahraini female
sprinter who wears a headscarf is described in television coverage
as a Muslim, her female teammate, dressed more conventionally, yet
as Muslim as the first, is not so described. The preferred
prerequisite for teaching an increasingly popular course on law
school campuses, Islamic law, is not familiarity with contemporary
Muslim legal systems, or a foreign law degree from a Muslim state,
or even an advanced law degree of any kind, but rather a doctorate
in Islamic studies, leaving most able to discuss at length thirteenth
century theories on contract, yet less comfortable talking about
Sanhuri's Civil Code, the template of Arab private law in the
modem world. One might well ask precisely what is so legal about
such a course, as far removed as it is from the law of the Muslim
polities.
As to what can be done to deal with this rather dispiriting state
of affairs, I have no panacea, and even if I did, I do not pretend to
have the influence necessary to bring about the realization of my
vision. Nevertheless, I can provide, I believe, at least some
rudimentary ideas on the manner in which I believe the Muslim
East might well be conceived and studied, at least among us
28. Kristen Stilt, Islamic Law and the Making and Remaking of the Iraqi Legal System,
36 GEO. WASH. INT'L. L. REV. 695, 750-54 (2004).
29. Id. at 753; Lombardi, supra note 9.
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comparatists, that would be, at once, less exoticizing, less
condescending and less distorting. I provide them in brief below.
First, it seems to me fundamental that if one is to understand
law in the Muslim world, the state's legal system must come first,
and Islamic law, while important, understood within the context of
that system. It is, after all, within the rubric of the state, either in
gaps left in the state's legal machinery or in state law enactment,
that Islamic law even exists. There are scholars who do this: Mark
Cammack has given us excellent work on Islamic law in Indonesia;30
Donald Horowitz has written a series of extraordinary articles on
the importation of Islamic law into Malaysia in a largely similar
manner;31 and Dan Stigall has discussed Islamic law in Iraq to
admirable effect.32  Unfortunately, however, such material is
dwarfed by the amount of work that simply wishes away the state
in favor of the construction of medieval rules, many entirely
obsolete, in some sort of political, social and economic vacuum. It is
not entirely clear by what conception this material can even be
considered "law" when so engaged. Certainly it is not any
conception of law that lawyers in the Muslim world who I know
would be familiar with.
Second, far more work needs to be done on matters concerning
the Muslim East that are not directly related to shari'a. I find it quite
ironic that in our quest to exoticize the Muslim East, so much focus
is placed on the role of Islam, where most comparatists are least
equipped to deal, to the derogation of matters in which many would
be able to shed more light. How does de-Ba'athification compare to
earlier efforts at de-Nazification? What model of property dispute
resolution does the Iraq Property Claims Commission employ, and
how does it relate to earlier efforts elsewhere in the world to deal
with seemingly intractable disputes of this sort? Rather than
unnatural and misguided focus on "theocratic constitutionalism,"
more work might be done as to the extremely broad federalism
embodied in the Iraq constitution, as a model for state organization,
or how precisely Iraq's extremely generous economic rights might
30. See, e.g., Mark Cammack, Islam, Nationalism and the State in Suharto's
Indonesia, 17 Wisc. INT. L.J. 27 (1999).
31. Donald Horowitz, The Qur'an And The Common Law: Islamic Law Reform And
The Theory Of Legal Change, 42 AM. J. CoMP. L. 233 (1994).
32. See generally, e.g., Dan E. Stigall, Iraqi Civil Law: Its Sources, Substance, And
Sundering, 16 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL. 1 (2006).
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well be given constitutional meaning. Rather than disquisitions on
UCC Article 9 and Islamic finance, analysis of differing local models
on obtaining security on a loan might well suggest different means
through which polities balance the interests of debtors and various
classes of creditors. There appears to me, at first glance, tremendous
opportunity to explore issues greatly understudied in the Muslim
world, to balance the near exclusive focus on shari'a concerns that
are, in many though not all contexts, marginal.
Finally, I think all of our law schools would do well with a few
more Muslim lawyers and legal professionals, and a few less experts
on medieval jurisprudence. I commend Cornell Law School for
offering my friend, Judge Raad Juhi, an opportunity to work there
for a year, and have no doubt that the perspective he brings to Iraqi
criminal law will be fresh and exciting. As the chief investigative
judge during the trial of Saddam Hussein, he will, I am absolutely
sure, have comparatively little to say that relates to the shari'a. More
interactions of this sort are invaluable, so that law schools, among
the Rest, might exchange ideas with their counterparts in the West,
and distortions and confusions concerning the true state of law in
the Muslim world thereby lessened, at least within our ivory tower.
[Vol. 32:2
